The idea of a multiverse -an ensemble of universes -has received increasing attention in cosmology, both as the outcome of the originating process that generated our own universe, and as an explanation for why our universe appears to be fine-tuned for life. Here we carefully consider how multiverses should be defined, stressing the distinction between the collection of all possible universes, and ensembles of really existing universes or universe domains (essential for anthropic arguments). We show that such realised ensembles are by no means unique. A measure on the space of all universes or universe domains is needed so that probabilities can be calculated. We examine these issues in the case of the set of Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) universes, and consider scenarios like chaotic inflation which propose how ensembles of universe domains may be generated. Finally, we discuss philosophical and metascientific issues raised by the concept of a really existing ensemble.
Introduction
The idea of a multiverse has been proposed as the only scientifically based way of avoiding the fine-tuning required to set up the conditions for our seemingly very unlikely universe to exist. Stephen Weinberg (2000) , for example, uses it to try to explain the value of the cosmological constant, which he then relates to anthropic issues. Martin employs it to try to explain the whole set of anthropic coincidences. These and similar proposals have been triggered by the dawning awareness among many researchers that there may be many other existing universes besides ours. This possibility has received strong stimulation from proposals like Andrei Linde's (1983 Linde's ( , 1990 ) chaotic inflationary scenario, in which the origin of our own observable universe region naturally involves the origin of many other similar expanding universe regions. Some strictly quantum cosmological scenarios also suggest an ensemble of actually existing universes, while some cosmologists have proposed the existence of an ensemble of completely disconnected universes. Such proposals are driven by the attempt to make the existence and characteristics of our observable universe more intelligible at the most fundamental level.
The fine-tuning problem itself is very controversial. Two counter-attacks maintain that there is no fine-tuning problem, so it is not necessary to construct solutions to it by employing the multiverse idea. The first promotes the view that whatever happens will always be unlikely (any hand of cards is as unlikely as any other). Thus, since it is just an example of chance, there is nothing special about a universe that admits life. The counter response is that the existence of life is quite unlike anything else in the physical world -its coming into being is not just like choosing one out of numerous essentially identical hands of cards. It is like being transformed into an entirely different higher level game, and so does indeed require explanation. The second counter-attack argues that inflation explains the current state of the universe, making its apparently unlikely state probable. However, this move is only partially successful, since very anisotropic or inhomogeneous models may never inflate. The counter response is that this does not matter: however small the chances are, if it works just once then that is sufficient to give a model close enough to the standard Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) cosmological models to be friendly to life. But this does not account for the rest of the coincidences enabling life, involving particle masses and the values of the fundamental constants.
There is in any case a vagueness about the proposed nature of multiverses. They might occur in various ways (discussed by Weinberg (2000) and Tegmark (2003) for example). First, they might originate naturally in different times and places through meta-cosmic processes like the chaotic inflation of Linde (1983 Linde ( , 1990 ) and Guth (Guth and Pi 1981), or L. Smolin's (1999) cosmic Darwinian vision. In the latter case, an ensemble of expanding universe regions grow from each other following gravitational collapse and re-expansion, where natural selection of universes through optimisation of black hole production leads to biofriendly universe regions. This is an intriguing idea, but with many uncertain steps -in particular no proof has been given of the last step, that the physics that maximises black hole production also favours life. Second, multiverses can be associated with the multi-universe Everett-Wheeler-type interpretation of quantum mechanics. Thirdly, multiverses can be truly disjoint collections of universes (see Sciama 1993 , Tegmark 1998 .
Issues of language are important here: by a considerable stretch of language, some refer to the separate expanding universe regions in chaotic inflation as 'universes', even though they have a common causal origin and are all part of the same single space-time. In our view (as 'uni' means 'one') the Universe is by definition the one unique causally connected 1 existing reality of which our ob-served expanding cosmological domain is a part. We will refer to situations such as in chaotic inflation as a Multi-Domain Universe, as opposed to a completely causally disconnected Multiverse as proposed by Tegmark and Rees. However, throughout the paper, when our discussion pertains equally well to disjoint collections of universes (multiverses in the strict sense) and to the different domains of a Multi-Domain Universe, we shall for simplicity simply use the word "ensemble". If an ensemble of universes are all generated by the same primordial physical or philosophical principle, as in the case of chaotic inflation, our observable universe domain would be a sub-region of this "universe as a whole". Then we could reserve "multiverse" for the collection of genuinely disconnected "universes" -those which are not produced by the same process, and so are completely unrelated to one another. So far, none of these provocative and interesting ideas have been developed to the point of actually describing such ensembles of universes in detail, defining their parameters, distribution functions, measures, and probabilities. Nor has it been demonstrated that a generic well-defined ensemble will admit life. Paul Davies (2003) has recently spoken interestingly along these lines. Some writers, like Sciama (1993) and , tend to imply that there is only one possible multiverse (characterised by "all that can exist does exist"). This vague prescription actually allows a vast variety of different realisations with differing properties, leading to major problems in the definition of the ensembles and in averaging, due to the lack of a well-defined measure and the infinite character of the ensemble itself. Furthermore, as we shall see below, it is not at all clear that we shall ever be able to accurately delineate the class of all possible universes. It is not our conceptualisations or models that determine the limits of what is possible. There may be universes which we believe are possible on the basis of what we know of physics, that may in fact not be possible. There may also be universes which we conceive of as being impossible for one reason or another, that turn out to be possible. And it is very likely that we simply may not be able to imagine or envisage all the possibilities.
At this point, it is crucial to recognise that anthropic arguments based on ensembles require an actually existing ensemble with all the required properties (see below). Simply having a conceptual, or conceptually possible, ensemble is not adequate.
Finally, as will be addressed more fully later, there are important philosophical issues which arise in considering ensembles. The first is testability: Is there any conceivable direct or indirect way of testing for existence of an ensemble to which our universe belongs, and the supposed underlying (meta)physics which governs it and its constituent universes? Are there acceptable notions of scientific testability which would give scientific status to such proposals, or are there some that could at least give them a metaphysical status? As we shall see later, there are no compelling accounts of scientific testability which could connected all the time by C 1 timelike lines (which is not true even in Minkowski spacetime), but rather that all universe domains are the result of operation of a common causal process and so have a common causal origin. This means they are all connected by C 0 timelike lines allowing reversals in their direction of time (as in Feynman's approach to electrodynamics). do this without insisting on strong evidence for the realisation of a very specific ensemble, or class of ensembles, and on its long-term success in predicting, explaining and inter-relating phenomena better than competing accounts; but it is highly unlikely this will ever be attained.
The second philosophical issue is: what would explain the existence of an ensemble, and its specific properties? Why should there be this particular ensemble, rather than some other one? Why should there be any regularity at all in its properties? If there are such regularities, and specific resulting properties, this suggests a mechanism creating that family of universes, and hence a causal link to a higher domain. This in turn means that the individual universes making up the ensemble are not actually independent of each other. They are, instead, products of a single process, as in the case of chaotic inflation. In that case, what may be referred to as a "multi-verse" is in fact the true concept of the Universe, the "Universe as a whole" -the single related physical entity that exists and includes the existence of the expanding universe region we observe as well as many other similar domains. A variety of expanding domains may separate out and become causally independent of each other at late timesbut the same is true of black holes, and we do not call them multiverses. A common generating mechanism is clearly a causal connection -and some such mechanism is needed if all the universes in an ensemble have the same class of properties, for example being governed by the same physical laws or meta-laws. Any multiverse with regular properties we can characterise systematically is of this kind. The physics problem is that there is no way we can test any proposed mechanism to impose such regularities. Our fundamental starting point, then, is the recognition that there is an important distinction to be made between possible universes and realised universes, and our main conclusion is that a really existing ensemble or multiverse is not a priori unique, nor uniquely defined. It must somehow be selected for. The only possible exception is, as we have briefly implied above, if the realised multiverse is exactly the same as, and no larger than, the ensemble of all possible universes. This would be unique if it could be defined uniquely. But then one would have to justify why all possible universes are realised, and why the implied distribution function pertaining to this collection of all possible universes allows only one copy of each. All of them are then realised just once, and that implies a very particular distribution function. If some are realised multiple times, then another distribution function is needed, which in turn must be justified or explained. But then this ensemble of all universes which are both possible and realised is not unique, since each possible distribution function specifies a different multiverse.
Describing Ensembles: Possibility and Realised Possibility
We have mentioned above that, for constructing anthropic arguments using an ensemble, the ensemble itself must be a really existing ensemble of universes, and not merely a conceptual one. This compels us, first of all, to develop adequate methods for describing and defining an ensemble of real, actually existing universes within the larger class of all possible universes. It, secondly, requires us to specify, at least in principle, all the ways in which these universes, real or possible, can be different from one another, in terms of their physics, chemistry, biology, etc. In identifying which universes allow for the emergence and sustenance of life, this involves in addition specifying at least heuristically the parameter ranges expressing the conditions necessary for life. However it may never be possible to specify in detail the full range of conditions which are sufficient for self-conscious intelligent life. We shall now tackle these two important tasks.
The Set of Possible Universes
The basis for describing ensembles or multiverses is contained in the structure and the dynamics of a space M of all possible universes m, each of which can be described in terms of a set of states s in a state space S. Each universe in M will be characterised by a set P of distinguishing parameters p, which are coordinates on M. Each universe m will evolve from its initial state to some final state according to the dynamics operative, with some or all of its parameters varying as it does so. The course of this evolution of states will be represented by a path in the state space S, depending on the parametrisation of S. Thus, each such path (in degenerate cases a point) is a representation of one of the universes m in M.
2 The coordinates in S will be directly related to the parameters specifying members of M. The parameter space P has dimension N which is the dimension of the space of models M; the space of states S has N + 1 dimensions, the extra dimension indicating the change of each model's states with time, characterised by an extra parameter, e.g., H which does not distinguish between models but rather determines what is the state of dynamical evolution of each model.
It is possible that with some parameter choices the same physical universe m will be multiply represented by this description; thus a significant issue is the equivalence problem -identifying which different representations might in fact represent the same universe model.
It is obvious that the very description of this space M of possibilities is based on an assumed set of laws of behaviour, either laws of physics or meta-laws that determine the laws of physics, which all universes m have in common. The detailed description of this space, and its relationship to S, will depend on the matter description used and its behaviour. Thus, the overall description of M must incorporate a description both of the geometry of the allowed universes (see Uggla, et al. 2003) and of the physics of matter. Thus the set of parameters P will include both geometric and physical parameters. As we shall also discuss later, M needs a measure which will indicate the relative volumes of its different sectors in terms of the chosen coordinates, for otherwise we cannot define probabilities or employ distribution functions on M, which are necessary for taking the next step -defining realisations of M as specific subsets of M (the set of all possible universes) which really exist.
The space M has a number of important subsets, for example:
1. M FLRW -the subset of all possible exactly FLRW universes, described by the state space S FLRW (in the case of dust plus non-interacting radiation a careful description of this phase space has been given by Ehlers and Rindler (1989) ).
2. M almost−FLRW -the subset of all perturbed FLRW model universes.
3. M anthropic -the subset of all possible universes in which life emerges at some stage in their evolution. This subset intersects M almost−FLRW , and may even be a subset of M almost−FLRW , but does not intersect M FLRW (realistic models of a life-bearing universe like ours cannot be exactly FLRW, for then there is no structure).
4. M Observational -the subset of models compatible with current astronomical observations. Precisely because we need observers to make observations, this is a subset of M anthropic .
If M truly represents all possibilities, one must have a description that is wide enough to encompass all possibilities. It is here that major issues arise: how do we decide what all the possibilities are? What are the limits of possibility? What classifications of possibility are to be included? We shall address this issue in subsection 2.4 below; here we briefly give several examples to illustrate these issues.
The subspace of physical parameters P physics used to describe M might include a parameter p physics (i) such that: for i = 1 there is no physics; for i = 2 physics is governed by variational principles; for i = 3 physics in governed by local deities; for i = 4 physics is governed by the magic which is described in the Harry Potter series of books. How does one rule out what is possible or impossible, given other possible laws of nature than the ones with which we are familiar?
Similarly, for the subspace P grav we could define a parameter p grav (i) such that: for i = 1 there is no gravity; for i = 2 there is Newtonian gravity; for i = 3 general relativity is the correct theory at all energies -there is no quantum gravity regime; for i = 4 loop quantum gravity is the correct quantum gravity theory; for i = 5 a particular version of superstring theory or M-theory is the correct theory.
Choices such as these will arise for all the laws and parameters of physics. In some universes there will be a fundamental unification of physics expressible in a basic "theory of everything", in others this will not be so. Some universes will be realised as branes in a higher dimensional spacetime, others will not. Underlying physics is the set of differing possible mathematical and logical structures which also need characterisation. Thus, there might be logical options characterised by a parameter p logic (i) such that: for i = 1 there is no operational logic; for i = 2 there is Boolean logic; for i = 3 there is quantum logic; for i = 4 there is fuzzy logic, etc.
Thus "All that can happen happens" must imply all possibilities, as characterised by our description in terms of such families of parameters -all occur in all possible combinations, along with many other possibilities we cannot even conceive of, but which can nevertheless in principle also be described by such parameters. The full space M must be large enough to represent all of these possibilities. However this is by no means a statement that "all" is arbitrary. On the contrary, specifying the set of possible parameters determines a uniform high-level structure that is obeyed by all universes in M .
From these considerations we have the first key issue:
Issue 1: What determines M? Where does this structure come from? What is the meta-cause that delimits this set of possibilities? Why is there a uniform structure across all universes m in M?
The Set of Realised Universes
In order to select from M a set of realised universes we need to define on M a distribution function f (m) specifying how many times each type of possible universe m in M is realised. This might be discrete (e. g., there are 3 copies of universe m 1 and 4 copies of universe m 2 , with no copies of any other possible universe), or continuous. In many cases a distribution function will exclude many possible universes from the realisation it specifies. The function f (m) expresses the contingency in any actualisation -the fact that not every possible universe has to be realised, and that any actual universe does not have to be realised as a matter of necessity. Things could have been different! Thus, f (m) describes the ensemble of universes or multiverse envisaged as being realised out of the set of possibilities. If these realisations were determined by the laws of necessity alone, they would simply be the set of possibilities described by M. In general they include only a subset of possible universes, and multiple realisations of some of them. This is the way in which chance or contingency is realised in the ensemble. And in the case of a continuous f (m) this only attains mathematical precision and meaning when a measure dm on M is given, so that integrals over the space give numbers, averages, and probabilities.
Now it is conceivable that all possibilities are realised -that all universes in M exist at least once. This would mean that the distribution function f (m) = 0 for all m ∈ M. But there are an infinite number of distribution functions which would fulfil this condition, and so a really existing 'ensemble of all possible universes' is not unique. In such ensembles, all possible values of each distinguishing parameter would be predicted to exist in different members of the multiverse in all possible combinations with all other parameters at least once. One of the problems this then raises is that this often means that the integrals associated with such distribution functions would diverge, preventing the calculation of probabilities from such models (see our treatment of the FLRW case below).
From this consideration we have the second key issue:
What is the meta-cause that delimits the set of realisations out of the set of possibilities?
The answer to this question has to be different from the answer to Issue 1, precisely because here we are describing the contingency of selection of a subset of possibilities from the set of all possibilities, determination of the latter being what is considered in Issue 1.
Measures and Probabilities
It is clear that f (m) will enable us to derive numbers and probabilities relative to the realisation it defines only if we also have a proper measure dm on the ensemble. There are two separate issues here.
First, the measure dm needs to be defined in a satisfactory way that enables mean values and averages for a given multiverse to be determined. However, what may seem to be a "natural" measure for M in one set of coordinates will not be natural in another set of coordinates. Hence the concept of a measure is not unique, as is illustrated below in the FLRW case. Furthermore the relevant integrals may diverge. Thus, assigning mean values or averages for physical quantities in an ensemble of universes is problematic. Secondly, it is also possible that we might be able to assign probabilities χ(m) to points of M, and then predict f (m) from these. However, we then have to determine some reason why χ(m) is what it is and how it then leads to f (m). Realising such probabilities seems to imply a causal mechanism relating the created members of the multiverse to one another so they are not in fact causally disjoint. Otherwise, there is no reason why any probability law (Gaussian normal, for example) should be obeyed.
Problems With Infinity
When speaking of multiverses or ensembles of universes -possible or realisedthe issue of infinity often crops up. Researchers often envision an infinite set of universes, in which all possibilities are realised. Can there really be an infinite set of really existing universes -whether countably infinite or non-countably infinite? We shall not go into these questions in depth here, but we suggest that, on the basis of well-known philosophical arguments, the answer is No. It is important to be aware that the issue of realised infinity is a controversial and uncertain one in philosophy and in the philosophy of mathematics.
There is no conceptual problem with an infinite set -countable or uncountable -of possible universes. A potentially infinite set is not a problem. Nevertheless, if the set of possible models is uncountable infinite and there is only a countably infinite (or finite) number of universes in the ensemble then almost all possible models are not realised -the ensemble represents a set of measure zero in the set of possible universes.
However, as stressed by the mathematician David Hilbert (1964) , a really existing infinite set is probably not possible -there are strong philosophical arguments against it. Others (Spitzer 2000 , Stoeger 2003 ) have elaborated aspects of this issue. Whenever infinities emerge in physics -such as in the case of singularities -we can be reasonably sure, as is usually recognised, that there has been a breakdown in our models. An achieved infinity in any parameter (temperature, density, spatial curvature) is almost certainly not a possible outcome of any physical process -simply because it means traversing in actuality an interval of values which never ends. Infinity is not an actual number we ever can specify or reach -it is simply a code-word for "it continues without end". The same may be true in terms of the supposed ensembles of universes. It is difficult enough conceiving of an ensemble of many 'really existing' universes that are totally causally disjoint from our own, and how that could come into being, particularly given that many universes in the ensemble may themselves be claimed to have infinite spatial extent and to contain an infinite amount of matter, with the paradoxical conclusions that entails (Ellis and Brundrit 1979) . To conceive of physical creation of an infinite set of universes (many of which will themselves be spatially infinite) is at least an order of magnitude more difficult. The phrase 'everything that can exist, exists' might well imply such an infinitude, but glosses over all the profound difficulties implied.
Adequately Specifying Possible and Real Universes
When defining any ensemble of universes, possible or realised, we must specify all the parameters which differentiate members of the ensemble from one another at any time in their evolution. The values of these parameters may not be known or determinable initially in many cases -some of them may only be set by transitions that occur via processes like symmetry breaking or the evolutionary emergence of more complex systems within given members of the ensemble. In particular, some of the parameters whose values are important for the origination and support of life may only be fixed later in the evolution of universes in the multiverse. There may be other parameters which are crucial for the emergence of complexity (and of self-conscious life) that we are as yet unable to specify. This category of unknown parameters should be added to the general set of parameters we are considering.
Large subsets of the ensemble may not even admit of such parameters, since their more fundamental cosmological and physical parameters will not allow them to reach a stage of evolution where higher levels of complexity are possible. The more basic and simpler necessary conditions for complexity and life will not have been fulfilled. It will be relatively easy to tag such non-biofriendly subsets. It will be practically impossible at any stage to characterise that set of the multiverse in which all the conditions necessary for the emergence of self-conscious life and its maintenance have been met. There may be universes with the very same cosmological specifications which differ crucially later on in their evolution -e. g., those which allow for an advanced chemistry, but which, for reasons we may not yet appreciate, do not allow for the emergence of life. The most we can do is to specify the subset of members of the ensemble for which a certain stage of complexity is possible -on the basis of the ranges of values for each specified parameter we know enough about to assign "bio-friendly intervals". In light of this, we can separate our set of parameters P for the space of all possible universes M into different categories, beginning with the most basic or fundamental, and progressing to more derivative, complex, or less-certain categories. Ideally they should all be independent of one another, but we will not be able to establish that independence for each parameter, except for the most fundamental cosmological ones. In order to categorise our parameters, we might doubly index each parameter p in P as p j (i) such that those for j = 1 − 3 describe basic physics, for j = 4 − 6 describe the cosmology (given that basic physics), and j = 7 pertains specifically to emergence and life: 1. p 1 (i) are the basic matter-field parameters within each universe, e.g., the fine-structure constant α, and parameters characterising the basic nongravitational laws of physics 2. p 2 (i) are particle parameters describing basic particle properties (masses, charges, spins, etc.) 3. p 3 (i) are physical parameters which are set by symmetry breaking -some of p 1 (i) and p 2 (i) might be put here, if they are only set after the universes have evolved away from their initial points 4. p 4 (i) are basic parameters describing the cosmological dynamics , e. g., i = 1 indicates Einstein gravity dominates, i = 2 indicates Brans-Dicke theory dominates, i = 3 indicates Electro-magnetism dominates, etc. Associated with each choice are the relevant parameters which can range over a whole set of values, e.g., G, Λ, and in the Brans-Dicke case ω, etc.
5. p 5 (i) are cosmological parameters related to the matter content. These parameters encode whether radiation, dark matter, scalar fields etc. are accounted for and define relevant parameter values and functions (like the scalar field potential). 6. p 6 (i) are cosmological parameters related to the specific solutions envisaged, like space-time geometry, matter densities etc.
3 7. p 7 (i) are parameters related to the emergence of complexity, like chemically and biologically relevant parameters, and parameters related to the emergence of self-conscious life.
As we mentioned earlier, for many of the universes in a given ensemble, higher order parameters may not even be relevant, since the structures to which they refer may not ever be able to emerge. Many higher order parameters can only be specified in subsets of the multiverse in which lower level parameters have certain narrow ranges of values. Outside of those subsets, the higher order parameters are set to zero.
The lower values of j are the easier ones to investigate anthropically. At level 1, for instance, we can make a cut between those consistent with the eventual emergence of life and those incompatible with it. At level 2 we can narrow the possibilities even more. Thus, we shall get the number of universes consistent with self-conscious life as:
This clearly fits very nicely with Bayesian Inference approach to probability and provides the beginnings of an implementation of it for these multiverses. This approach also clearly keeps the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions intact throughout. At each level we add to the necessary conditions for complexity or life, weeding out those universes which fail to meet any single necessary condition. Sufficiency is never really reached in our description -we really do not know the full set of conditions which achieve sufficiency. Life demands unique combinations of many different parameter values that must be realised simultaneously. When we look at these combinations they will span a very small subset of the whole parameter space (Davis 2003) .
This discussion raises, and even presupposes the resolution of, certain important issues: Can truly new qualities emerge in the course of evolution of a given universe? Or must they have precursors which inevitably trigger their realisation at certain transition points in cosmic evolution? That is, is true emergence of novelty possible, or is it always just a realisation of features that were present in latent form all along? This is really the issue of ontological and causal reductionism. In our discussion in this subsection we have presumed that full ontological and causal reductionism is not possible -as seems to be the case, from the evidence we have from quantum phenomena like superfluidity and the quantum hall effect (Laughlin 1999) and from the sciences of complexity: phenomena like spontaneous symmetry breaking, the physics of complex systems, and the generation and reliable transfer of the biological (semantic) information which is essential for living systems. But we could be incorrect in assuming this. If so, the number of parameters necessary for adequately characterising the multiverse M may be fewer than we have implied here.
Whether or not reductionism or the genuine emergence of new and surprising characteristics turns out to be the more accurate characterisation of reality, one thing is certain. If the ensemble is to relate to all of reality including human consciousness it must also include aspects of human understanding and ideas as well as intentions and goals, because they are demonstrably causally effective (they have for example led to the text you are now reading). However, physics as we know it today is unable to encompass these dimensions; for example it is unable to explain even the existence of a pair of spectacles, let alone a Jumbo jet, because it does not have within its competence the ability to describe human theories and intellectual comprehension, nor human emotions and intentions or social constructions. However as just stated, these are clearly all causally effective in the physical world (without them spectacles and the Jumbo Jet and chess games would not exist). Physics as we know it cannot comprehend these issues, and so by itself cannot give a causally complete description of the universe . A 'Theory of Everything' of the kind envisaged by string theorists, for example, simply does not by itself have the capacity to handle such issues. Either physics must be extended so as to include these dimensions of existence (such as consciousness) because they are causally effective, or it must give up the claim to provide a complete causal description of features that affect the physical world.
In either case, the implication is that laws of physics of the kind we currently have at hand do not by themselves suffice to encompass all of causation. The effects of consciousness must be included in any causally complete scheme. Consequently a complete description of an ensemble of universes capable of including these effects should include in the parameter space P 7 variables that can describe them. We do not know what the proper description of this space is, but without it we do not have an ensemble that can adequately handle the issue of the existence and nature of life. We need to try somehow to consider all that is possible -all that can happen -in this realm, too. We do not have a reliable basis for undertaking that task at present.
Ensembles of FLRW Universes
Having established the broad set of issues concerning multiverses that we believe need to be addressed, we shall for the remainder of this paper limit ourselves to the FLRW sector M FLRW of the ensemble of all possible universes -or all possible universe domains -M in order to illustrate these issues. We assume the family considered is filled with matter components characterised by a γ-law equation of state, and mainly restrict our attention to their cosmological parameters, although full consideration of anthropic issues would be characterised by including level 7 parameters (p 7 ). Our descriptive treatment will, in the end, pose the question of the process that generates the really existing ensemble, considering the individual universe domains (whether a true multiverse or separate domains in a single spacetime) as distinct but with common physical characteristics.
Parametrising FLRW models
FLRW models are homogeneous and isotropic models described by the metric
where dΩ 2 = dϑ 2 + sin 2 (ϑ) dϕ 2 denotes the line element on the two-dimensional unit sphere, a(t) is the scale-factor, and
for closed models 0 for flat models −1 for open models is the normalised curvature. The FLRW model is completely determined by k and the scale-factor a(t), which incorporates the time-evolution and is obtained from the Einstein-Field equations together with the matter description.
The evolution of FLRW models is described by the Friedmann equation
where H ≡ȧ/a (a dot denotes differentiation with respect to proper time) is the Hubble parameter and Ω the density parameter. We restrict our discussion to models with only a cosmological constant and one matter component which obeys a γ-law equation of state, i.e., its pressure p and density ρ are related by p = (γ − 1)ρ, where γ is constant. This includes in particular the case of dust (γ = 1) and radiation (γ = 4/3). The total density parameter is
where the matter density parameter is Ω m ≡ κρ 3H 2 and the vacuum-energy density parameter is Ω Λ ≡ Λ 3H 2 (representing a cosmological constant). The second time derivative of the scale factor is determined by the Raychaudhuri equation
where q ≡ −ä aH 2 is the dimensionless deceleration parameter. The matter evolution is given by the energy-conservation equatioṅ
or equivalently byΩ m = Ω m H(q + 1 − 3γ). Besides the normalised curvature k there are two constants of motion, χ ≡ κρa 3γ /3 and the cosmological constant Λ.
In order to define a FLRW ensemble we need a set of independent parameters which uniquely identify all possible models. We want to consider all possible FLRW models with the same physical laws as in our universe, but possibly different coupling constants. There is then one set of parameters which defines the "physics" of the model in terms of the coupling constants -for simplicity let us only consider the gravitational constant G here -and another set which identifies the actual model. Among the various options there are two particularly useful parametrisations. Ehlers and Rindler (1989) developed a parametrisation in terms of the observable density parameters (they also include a radiation component) and the Hubble parameter. With Ω k ≡ k H 2 a 2 the Friedmann equation becomes
The curvature parameter Ω k determines k = sgn(Ω k ). For k = 0 the scale-factor, and hence the metric (1), is determined by
, while for k = 0 its value is unimportant because of scale-invariance in that case. Hence any state is completely described by Ω m , Ω Λ , and H. In order to parametrise the models rather than the states, we need to select one particular time t 0 for each model at which we take the above parameters as representative parameters Ω m0 , Ω Λ0 , and H 0 for this model. 4 We note that this time t 0 can be model dependent because not all models will reach the age t 0 .
All big-bang FLRW models start with an infinite positive Hubble parameter whose absolute value reaches or approaches asymptotically a minimum value H min . Hence we could define the time t 0 as the time when the model first takes a certain value H 0 (p I ) > H min (p I ) , where p I represents the model parameters. One particular choice of H 0 (p I ) is given by
On the other hand, by setting H 0 (p I ) = const and excluding all models which never reach this value one finds easily a parametrisation of all models which reach this Hubble value during their evolution.
While the above choice of parameters give a convenient parametrisation in terms of observables which covers closed, flat, and open models, it is disturbing that for each model an arbitrary time has to be chosen. This also leads to a technical difficulty, because the parameters {H 0 , Ω m0 , Ω Λ0 } are subject to the constraint H 0 = H 0 (p I ).
For these reasons it is often convenient to use a set of parameters which are comoving in the state-space, i.e., parameters which are constants of motion. As mentioned above, for open and closed models such a set is given by the matter Models which reach H = 0 (in a finite time) reverse their direction of evolution, i.e., they follow the same line backwards. These are the re-collapsing models. The limiting case of the forever-expanding models is given by the model which approaches asymptotically the Einstein-static universe.
constant χ, the cosmological constant Λ, and the normalised curvature constant k. For flat models one can rescale the scale factor, which allows us to set χ = 1. These parameters are related to the observational quantities by (for k = ±1 )
The evolution of these models through state space is illustrated here in terms of two different parametrisations of the state space, see Figures 1a and 1b. For a detailed investigation of these evolutions for models with non-interacting matter and radiation, see Ehlers and Rindler (1989) .
The possibility space
The structures defined so far are the uniform structures across the class of models in this possibility space, characterised both by laws of physics (in particular General Relativity) and by a restricted class of geometries. A key question (Issue 1) is: What determines this space of possibilities, which shapes the nature of the ensemble? Obviously, it could be anything, a priori. It is clear that universes or universe domains in an ensemble should be able to differ in at least some properties from each other. For a starting point one might assume that all FLRW models could be realised, though this is a strong assumption about the "creation process". If, for example, only a finite amount of energy is available for the creation of an universe, one would exclude flat and open models with their natural R 3 topology. The next question is, which physical laws and parameters can vary within the ensemble, and which values can they take? For this simplified discussion let us just assume that only the gravitational constant G and the cosmological constant Λ (which also qualifies as a model parameter) are variables, with the ranges 5 G ∈ [0, ∞) and Λ ∈ (−∞, ∞). However, if we consider "all that is possible" within this restricted class of FLRW models, maybe we should consider G ∈ (−∞, ∞). There is still considerable uncertainty as to the nature of an ensemble even within this restricted context.
The measure
For a complete probabilistic description of an ensemble we need not only a distribution function P , but also a measure µ for the parameter space. The information entropy
is then maximised for the probability distribution equal to this measure, representing the state of minimal knowledge. Without knowledge of the creation mechanism it is impossible to determine this measure with certainty. Nevertheless, we might ask what our best guess for such a measure should be in a state of minimal information, where only a certain set of independent parameters, describing the ensemble, and their ranges are known.
The only known method for constructing such a measure is Jaynes' principle. Its application to FLRW models with γ-law equation of state has been discussed in Kirchner and Ellis (2003) . One identifies a set of transformations x ′ (x) in possibility space which leaves the mathematical structure invariant, and demands that the measure is invariant under these transformations. The two most important cases are given by parameters which can take all real values, and those that take on all positive real values.
In the first case, if z is a valid parameter value, so is z ′ = z + α for all real α. According to Jaynes' principle the measure should obey µ(z)dz = µ(z ′ )dz ′ and hence µ(z) = µ(z ′ ), i.e., the measure is constant.
If on the other hand a parameter u only takes non-zero positive values, we can generate another valid parameter value by u ′ = λu, where λ ∈ R + . Demanding invariance of the measure yields µ(u) ∝ 1 u . These transformations are not unique, and hence one could find many different measures. Nevertheless, in the state of minimum information we don't know what the natural parametrisation is for the possibility space and different measures correspond to different guesses. Surprisingly Jaynes' principle is "relatively invariant" under simple parametrisation changes. For example, introducing a new parametrisation for a positive quantity G by G = m n for positive m, or by G = exp(λ) for real λ, will give the same measure.
There are two important points to note. Firstly the measure is derived from the chosen set of parameters. Generally a different choice of parameters yields a different minimum-information measure, predicting another maximum-entropy distribution function. Let us consider the example of an ensemble of dust-FLRW models. The different open and closed models are most conveniently parametrised by the constants of motion, which are given by the cosmological constant Λ and χ ≡ aρ 3γ , where ρ is the energy density. This leads to the minimum-information measure (Kirchner and Ellis 2003) .
Considering dust models (γ = 1) and the subset of all big-bang models which reach a certain Hubble parameter H 0 at a time t 0 during their evolution this measure becomes
with Ω Λ0 ≤ 1 + Ω m0 /2. On the other hand, as mentioned above, there is a convenient parametrisation for this particular subset of models (Ehlers and Rindler 1989) in terms of the observables Ω m0 and Ω Λ0 (in Ehlers and Rindler (1989) an additional radiation component was also included). Using this parametrisation yields the minimum information measure
which is clearly different from the above result. Secondly, the measure is in general non-normalisable and hence there is no normalisable maximum-entropy distribution. Without additional information we are not able to calculate certain probabilities. Since it seems questionable whether there will ever be additional information about the ensemble of universes available, one has to accept that certain questions will have no well defined probabilities.
It should be mentioned that we encounter similar problems when we want to find a probability measure for physical parameters like the gravitational constant G. Let us assume that G can take any non-zero positive value. Jaynes' principle then suggests the probability measure dµ G ∝ dG G . On the other hand, if we decide to use 6 m = sinh(G) as our parameter, then we find the different measure
Distribution Functions on M FLRW
Now, having properly parametrised M FLRW and defined a measure on it, we can represent particular multiverses by giving distribution functions over the parameter-space. Given a distribution function f it determines the number of universes in a small parameter-interval by
which is invariant under a change of parametrisation. Hence it is the combination of measure and distribution function which is of importance. While distribution functions can be parametrised by any set of coordinates over the possibility space, we need different distribution functions for different possibility spaces. For example, if universes or universe domains in an ensemble must have a common value for the gravitational constant G then distribution functions must not depend on G.
It is clear that a particular distribution function can be expressed in any set of coordinates. Obviously there is a vast set of possible distribution functions. We want to examine some particular examples.
Firstly, one could have a distribution function which is constant over the parameter-space. The actual ensemble then really depends on the measure and is the maximum-entropy distribution (which maximises (3) 7 ). If we choose the observational quantities H, Ω m , Ω Λ to represent the model and allow for different values of the gravitational coupling constant G this would be
for all allowed values of the stated parameters. On the other hand, if we choose the constants of motion as coordinates in possibility space
The probability P A to find a universe in a certain parameter-region A is given by
where the integral in the denominator extends over the whole possibility space. For many distribution functions, like for the above constant distribution function together with (4), this expression is not well defined. Let us assume that the measure is non-integrable, i.e., non-normalisable, and that we have a constant distribution function. If the set A does not include any point of non-integrability of the measure then P A = 0, if it includes all points of non-integrability then P A = 1, but if it includes only some of the non-integrabilities then P A is not well defined. Of course, the above expression might be integrable for all sets A given a good distribution function. For instance the distribution function
together with the measure (4) is integrable everywhere. On the other hand
is non-integrable at χ = 0 and χ → ∞. An ensemble might contain a finite or infinite countable number of universes. In these cases the distribution function contains Dirac δ -functions, e.g.,
which represents an ensemble which contains 5 copies of closed FLRW models with χ = 3 and Λ = .5, etc. The distribution function
represents an ensemble with an countably infinite number of universes -all are closed with Λ = 1 and one for each χ = 1/i. Similarly one could imagine an ensemble of 10 7 copies of our universe, which would be represented by the distribution function
where k 0 , χ 0 , Λ 0 represent the parameter values for our universe. This is very unlikely in term of a generating mechanism, but for ensembles without generating mechanisms it is as likely as any other possibility. If an ensemble is "tested" by its prediction that our universe is a likely member, then such an ensemble should be the most satisfying one -but then we might just as well be happy with one copy, i.e., just our universe.
Similar distribution functions determine the distribution of physical parameters like the gravitational constant G. For example with G ∈ the minimum information measure is dµ G = dG and
gives a Gaussian distribution around G = 0. If, on the other hand G ∈ (0, ∞) the measure is dG/G and f (g) = G exp(−G) would be an example of a distribution function. Now, so far none of the structures we have established deals directly with the probability that any universe in the multiverse will host life 8 . However, from our knowledge of the "anthropic ranges" of the cosmological parameters we can immediately identify those universes in which the emergence and sustenance of life is still possible -that is, those universes in which the necessary cosmological conditions have been fulfilled. Only a very few of these, perhaps, will actually be life-bearing, but that depends on the fulfilment of a large number of other conditions, which are represented by the higher level parameters. Strictly speaking, the probability that they will do so will only be given by a analysis of the higher level parameters similar to that we have given here for the cosmological parameters. We can, however, on the basis of what we have done, indicate that there is a probability of at least so many percent that a given universe in the multiverse will not be able to host life.
A key question (Issue 2) is: What determines a given distribution function f (G, H 0 , Ω i0 )? Obviously, it could be anything, a priori. The only way of determining it is through a process, or a "law of laws", by which the FLRW multiverse is generated. One can imagine various types of distributions, e. g., a Gaussian distribution in G or in H 0 , or in the other parameters. But, in order to establish these in a non-arbitrary way, we need a theory of how this particular multiverse is selected or determined from all the other possible ones.
Cosmological Processes Naturally Producing Multiverses
Over the past 15 or 20 years, many researchers investigating the very early universe have proposed processes at or near the Planck era which would generate a collection of many expanding universe domains -a really existing ensemble of such domains, one of which is our own observable universe. In fact, their work has provided both the context and stimulus for our discussions in this paper. Some of this work has led to proposals for a natural definition of a probability distribution on the space of a larger set of possible universes. Each of these probability distributions essentially selects a really existing effective ensemble through a generating process from a larger set of possible universes. Here we briefly describe some of the more notable such proposals, and comment on how they fit within the framework we have been discussing. Andrei Linde's (1983 Linde's ( , 1990 ) chaotic inflationary proposal (see also Linde (2003) and references therein) is one of the best known scenarios of this type. Certainly the chaotic inflationary process is capable of generating a really existing ensemble of expanding FLRW-like regions in a larger universe with very different characteristics, one of which may be our own observable universe region. As we have already pointed out, some prefer to call this ensemble "a multiverse", but, since all the regions are related by single process we prefer to refer to it as "a multi-domain Universe". As Linde and others point out, eternal inflation makes the Universe itself fractal, so that no FLRW approximation is possible globally. It therefore does not produce separate global almost-FLRW universes, but rather many FLRW-like domains of the same fractal universe. These domains can be very different from one another, and can be modelled locally by different FLRW cosmologies (Linde, private communication) .
Linde and others have applied a stochastic approach to inflation (Starobinsky 1986 , Linde, et al. 1994 , Vilenkin 1995 , Garriga and Vilenkin 2001 , through which probability distributions can be derived from inflaton potentials along with the usual cosmological equations (the Friedmann equation and the KleinGordon equation for the inflaton) and the slow-roll approximation for the inflationary era (see Linde (2003) for a recent brief summary and critical assessment). It is the scalar field (inflaton) in these scenarios which drives inflation and leads to the generation of the large numbers of disconnected regions of the Universe. A detailed example of this approach, in which specific probability distributions are derived from a Langevin-type equation describing the stochastic behaviour of the inflaton over horizon-sized regions before inflation begins, is given in Linde and Mezhlumian (2003) and in Linde et al. (1994) . The probability distributions determined in this way generally are functions of the inflaton potential. To make contact with our suggestions in this paper we would need to elaborate them into functions of the FLRW parameters we have used in the previous section. However, there remains the difficult problem of infinities: eternal inflation with its continual reproduction of different inflating domains of the Universe, seems to lead to an infinite number of universes of each particular type (Linde, private communication) . How can one deal with these infinities in terms of distribution functions and an adequate measure? There does not seem to be an adequate solution. And then as we have pointed out above, there is the deeper philosophical problem surrounding a realised infinite set of any kind.
Recently there has been similar work by Weinberg (2000) and by Garriga and Vilenki (2001) , attempting to derive the a priori probability distribution for the cosmological constant. The context is the same -an ensemble of regions generated in the same inflationary sequence via the action of a given inflaton potential. Likewise, the basic physics and cosmology framework is the same, even though the methods of deriving the probability distributions are simpler. During inflation the scalar field undergoes randomisation by quantum fluctuations, such that later on its values in different regions are distributed according to "the length" in field space (Garriga and Vilenkin 2002) This leads to a proba-bility distribution (or distribution function -the probability distribution is just the normalised distribution function) of values of the vacuum-energy density ρ Λ in these regions given by
where V (φ) is the inflaton potential, and the prime signifies differentiation with respect to the inflaton φ.
The progress that has been made on this kind of scenario suggests that there may be a really existing effective ensemble of many very different FLRW-like regions of a larger Universe, and provides toy models of how the overarching physics, or "law of laws", represented by the inflaton field and its potential can lead to an ensemble of regions or mini-universes. However, we must continue to bear in mind that these proposals rely for the most part on unknown physics together with extrapolations of presently known physics to realms far beyond where its reliability is assured. They also employ inflaton potentials which as yet have no connection to the particle physics we know at lower energies. And these proposals are not directly observationally testable -we have no astronomical evidence the supposed other FLRW-like regions exist. As we shall indicate below, there is a general approach to testability which is potentially capable of indirectly justifying scenarios like chaotic inflation and which predict the existence of a large number of different related but unobservable universe domains; but much more adequate versions of these scenarios -versions which really do explain more about reality than other theories -are needed before this justification will be possible.
Finally, from the point of view of the ensemble of all possible universes often invoked in discussions of multiverses, all possible inflaton potentials should be considered, as well as all solutions to all those potentials. These will include chaotic inflationary models which are stationary, as well as those which are nonstationary. Each of these can be regarded as providing effective ensembles of universe regions generated by a uniform causal mechanism (so that these regions are neither independent nor completely causally disconnected). Many of these potentials may yield ensembles which are uninteresting as far as the emergence of life is concerned, but some certainly will be. In order to select a really existing ensemble of universes or universe domains from these possibilities we must, from a theoretical perspective, have a procedure or operation for picking a given inflaton potential from all the possible ones. From an observational perspective likewise, we must at least have accumulating indirect support for choosing one of a definite class of potentials. Otherwise, the multiverse we assume to exist is purely arbitrary.
5 Non-uniqueness, Testability, Knowledge, and Existence
As we have seen earlier, there are quite a few provocative speculative proposals for such overarching physics, or law of laws, which select out and generate from the larger space of possible universes or universe domains a particular really existing effective ensemble. We have briefly discussed Andrei Linde's (1983 Linde's ( , 1990 ) chaotic inflationary process, Weinberg's (2000) application of Garriga and Vilenkin's (2001) quantum fluctuation "spherical cut-off" proposal, and Lee Smolin's (1999) Darwinian meta-cosmology. All of these do at least provide the beginnings of possible accounts of the origin of multiverses. Given all these possibilities, which specific kind of ensemble is claimed to exist? Given a specific such claim, how can one show that this is the particular ensemble that exists rather than all the other possibilities? What does existence mean in this context?
Fruitful Hypotheses and evidence
There are ways of justifying the existence of an entity, or entities, like a multiverse, even though we have no direct observations of it. Arguably the most compelling framework within which to discuss testability is that of "retroduction" or "abduction" which was first described in detail by C.S.Peirce. Ernan McMullin (1992) has convincingly demonstrated that retroduction is the rational process by which scientific conclusions are most fruitfully reached. On the basis of what researchers know, they construct imaginative hypotheses, which are then used to probe and to describe the phenomena in deeper and fuller ways than before. As they do so, they will modify or even replace the original hypotheses, in order to make them more fruitful and more precise in what they reveal and explain. The hypotheses themselves may often presume the existence of certain hidden properties or entities (like multiverses!) which are fundamental to the revealing and explanatory power they possess. As these hypotheses become more and more fruitful in revealing and explaining the natural phenomena they investigate, and their inter-relationships, and more central to scientific research in a given discipline, we can say that they become more and more reliable accounts of the reality they purport to model or describe. Even if some of the hidden properties or entities they postulate are never directly detected or observed, the success of the hypotheses indirectly leads us to affirm that something like them must exist. An example is the inflaton supposed to underlie inflation. Thus, from this point of view, their existence would be a valid -if still provisional -scientific conclusion if they turn out to be fruitful hypotheses. By a fruitful hypothesis we mean one that better enables us to make testable predictions which are fulfilled, or provides a more thorough and coherent explanation of phenomena we observe than competing theories. The relevant example here would be a fruitful theory relying on a specific type of multiverse, all members of which would never be directly detectable except one. But, since its postulated existence renders the existence and characteristic features of our own universe much more intelligible than without it, this can be claimed to be possible evidence for the multiverse's existence. If such indirect support for the existence of a given multiverse is inadequate in the light of other competing accounts, then from a scientific point of view all we can do is to treat it as a speculative scenario needing further development and requiring further fruitful application. Without that, espousing the existence of a given multiverse as the explanation for our life-bearing universe must surely be called metaphysics, because belief in its existence will forever be a matter of faith rather than proof.
We do, of course, want to avoid sliding to the bottom of Rees' (2001) slippery slope. If we are continually evaluating our theories and speculations with regard to their potential and actual fruitfulness in revealing and explaining the world around us, then we shall avoid the lower reaches of the slippery slope. The problem is that, in this case, the multiverse hypothesis must always remain provisional, because the necessary further evidence seems forever unattainable. This should not prevent us from entertaining imaginative scenarios, but the process will subject these speculations to rigorous critique over time. The key issue then is to what degree the multiverse hypothesis is fruitful. Unfortunately, as it stands now, it is not, because it can be used to explain anything at alland hence does not explain anything in particular. You cannot predict anything new from the hypothesis, but you can explain anything you already know. In order for it to achieve some measure of scientific fruitfulness, there must be an accumulation of at least indirect scientifically acceptable support for one particular well-defined multiverse.
In the end belief in an ensemble of universes or universe domains will be just that -a matter of faith, namely faith that the logical arguments discussed here give the correct answer in a situation where direct observational proof is unattainable and the supposed underlying physics is untestable -unless we are able to point to compelling reasons based on scientifically supportable evidence for a particular specifiable ensemble or one of a narrowly defined class of ensembles. One way in which this could be accomplished would be to find accumulating direct or indirect evidence that a very definite inflaton potential capable of generating a certain type of ensemble of universe domains was operating in the very early universe, leading to the particular physics that we observe now. Otherwise, there will be no way of ever knowing which particular multiverse is realised, if any one is. We will always be able to claim whatever we wish about such an ensemble, provided it includes at least one universe that admits life. Thus there are two further requirements which must still be met, once we have proposed a viable ensemble or multiverse theory. The first is to provide some credible link between these vast extrapolations from presently known physics to physics in which we have some confidence. The second is to provide some at least indirect evidence that the scalar potentials, or other overarching cosmic principles involved, really have been functioning in the very early universe, or before its emergence.
Metaphysical Issues
In applying the criteria of testability referred to briefly above, we must realize that no scientifically accessible cause is going to provide a adequate resolution or answer to ultimate questions. The metaphysical issues continue to hover in the background. Even after we have provided scientific accounts for the realisation of a given ensemble of universes or universe domains, there will still be the issue of why a particular overarching physics or cosmic principle generates it, rather than some other one. Furthermore, it is clear that the particular primordial process or principle selected will only be a provisional description of the principle underlying any actually existing ensemble, granting that there is one. The actually existing ensemble may be much, much larger -or much, much smaller -than the one our limited physics describes, and may embody quite different generating processes and principles than the ones which we provisionally settle upon. For example, it may very well be that the actually existing ensemble to which we belong embraces vast subsets of universes with properties and categories of life and complexity we have no concept of -the anthropic almost-FLRW universes may only be a very small and peculiar subset of these. Again, ultimate questions will be: Why this ensemble with these properties rather than others? What endows these with existence and with this particular type of overall order? And there are metaphysical issues concerning possibility. What are the ultimate boundaries of possibility -what makes something possible, even though it may never be realised? How can we know what is really possible or not, beyond knowing what actually exists? The only traditionally secure grounds for determining possibility is existence -"ab esse ad posse valet illatio". Are there other secure grounds than this? Maybe we need to introduce some new kind of metaphysical argumentation here, based on some underlying principles of meaning and coherence, that can shape our viewpoint and guide the argument.
Conclusion
We have pointed out a clear distinction between an ensemble of possible universes and an ensemble of really existing universes, which is envisioned as generated by the given primordial process or action of an overarching cosmic principle. These effectively select a really existing ensemble from the possible universes considered and, as such, effectively define a distribution function over the space of possible universes. Thus, there is a definite causal connection, or "law of laws", relating all the universes in these ensembles. It is this really existing ensemble of universes, not the ensemble of all possible universes, which provides the basis for anthropic arguments. The ensemble of universes from which the ensemble of really existing universes is selected is M, the ensemble of all possible universes. But anthropic universes lie in a much smaller subset of these, whose characteristics we understand to some extent. Higher level parameters specifying necessary conditions for the emergence of life beyond those of basic cosmology need to be considered as we develop the theory further. Using the concept of "really existing multiverses" we can locate those for whom the basic necessary conditions for life as we know and understand it have been fulfilled, but we are unable to say with any confidence what other necessary conditionsat higher levels -must yet be specified for sufficiency. It is very likely that the simultaneous realisation of all the conditions for life will pick out only a very small sector of the parameter space of all possibilities. Any progress on this problem depends heavily on the resolution of reductionism/emergence issues mentioned earlier.
Among those universes in which the necessary cosmic conditions for life have been fulfilled is the subset of almost-FLRW universes which are possible models of our own observable universe, given the precision of the observational data we have at present. It is, however, abundantly clear that "the really existing multiverses" which can be generated or defined as candidates for the one to which our universe belongs are not unique, and neither their properties nor existence is directly testable. Philosophical arguments for their existence would be stronger if the hypothesis were fruitful in enabling new investigations leading to new predictions that are testable; however, we have argued that -precisely because of this non-uniqueness -this is not the case. The only way in which arguments for their existence would become at all scientifically acceptable is if, for instance, there would be emerging corroborated evidence (either direct or indirect) for the existence of specific inflaton potential or one of a specific class of inflaton potentials, which would generate a specific type of ensemble of universe domains. Perhaps progress in quantum cosmology will in the future lead to some unique theory of creation and existence that will guide the discussion. At present, uniqueness eludes us.
